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WHO’S YOUR SOVEREIGN?: THE STANDING DOCTRINE OF
PARENS PATRIAE & STATE LAWSUITS DEFENDING
SANCTUARY POLICIES
Lexi Zerrillo*
Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free, the wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these,
the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden
door!
—Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (Nov. 2, 1883)1
INTRODUCTION
America has a long and complex history with immigration. In recent years, immi-
gration policy has been at the forefront of the most contentious issues that remain
salient and seemingly unsolvable.2 But imagine being too afraid to drive your children
to and from school, because you may be pulled over at an immigration-check road-
block. Or imagine feeling compelled to only take back-road, circuitous routes to work
which add minutes or hours to your commute because you must avoid being pulled
over for any reason. For many documented and undocumented immigrants in the
United States these are not mere imaginings; they have manifested into a terrible real-
ity of everyday life.3 In February of 2017, the residents of Las Cruces, New Mexico,
experienced this terror.4 Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) conducted
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2019. BA, Stonehill College, 2016. It
would be justifiably vexing for my parents if I did not sincerely thank them for supporting me
throughout the process of putting this Note together. I would be nowhere without their sup-
port. I also want to thank Professor Tara Leigh Grove for her endless enthusiasm for the world
of Federal Courts, which led me to take on this topic.
1 National Park Service, The New Colossus, https://www.nps.gov/stli/learn/historycul
ture/colossus.htm [https://perma.cc/P3P9-92K2] (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
2 See generally Kate M. Manuel, State Challenges to Federal Enforcement of Immigra-
tion Law: From the Mid-1990s to the Present, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Aug. 1,
2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43839.pdf [https://perma.cc/HC8W-G2UN] (highlight-
ing many of the cases states have brought challenging immigration policies since the 1990s).
3 See, e.g., Ray Sanchez, After ICE Arrests, Fear Spreads Among Undocumented Immi-
grants, CNN (Feb. 12, 2017, 7:10 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/11/politics/immigra
tion-roundups-community-fear/index.html [https://perma.cc/QT68-NDS9] (noting this fear
leads families to keep their children home from school, avoid going out to restaurants, or even
answering knocks on their doors).
4 Jonathan Blitzer, After an Immigration Raid, a City’s Students Vanish, NEW YORKER
(Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/after-an-immigration-raid-a
-citys-students-vanish [https://perma.cc/MLH7-FY3R].
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a raid on the outskirts of their town after President Trump signed executive orders
initiating a crackdown on undocumented immigrants.5 Rumors immediately spread
throughout the town that this was only the first of many raids to come, and as a
result “twenty-one-hundred of the district’s twenty-five thousand students missed
school” the next day, and two thousand were absent on the following day.6 The
superintendent wrote a letter to parents, assuring them that the school “[did] ‘not anti-
cipate any ICE activity occurring on school campuses’” but teachers and staff were
astounded by the two-day drop in attendance immediately after this initial raid.7
This impact is not limited to borderland communities like those in New Mexico.8
In 2016, educators in Prince George’s County, Maryland, wrote to the Department of
Homeland Security citing emotional and social impacts of raids on their student com-
munities.9 Durham, North Carolina, also faced large drops in attendance “after a student
was taken into custody by immigration agents while walking to school.”10 These types
of stories are only becoming more common, with one hundred people detained in Los
Angeles in one week during the month of February 2018.11 Some states and cities have
responded by actively advising their law enforcement agents not to target sensitive
locations, like schools, hospitals, or churches.12 But these types of “sanctuary poli-
cies” have been targeted and adamantly threatened by the Trump Administration.13
Questions linger about who, if anyone, can sue to stop the Executive Branch
from forcing states and municipalities to end these sanctuary policies. In recent Su-
preme Court history, Texas tried to sue to compel the Federal Government to enforce
federal immigration laws.14 But presented here is the inverse of what was at stake
in United States v. Texas; the issue is whether the executive can force states to comply
with the federal immigration enforcement scheme, especially when that scheme
commandeers local and state police and commands them to apply certain tactics.15
5 Id.





11 James Doubek, ICE Detains More Than 100 in Los Angeles–Area Immigration Raids,
NPR (Feb. 15, 2018, 8:26 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/15/58597
3495/ice-detains-more-than-100-in-los-angeles-area-immigration-raids [https://perma.cc
/C5TY-RGRQ].
12 See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
13 See infra Section I.C.
14 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). See also Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign
Preemption State Standing, 112 NW. L. REV. 201, 247–48 (2017) (discussing this lawsuit as
an example of states suing because of “underenforcement” of federal immigration law).
15 See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Summary of Executive Orders
on Immigration (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/summary-of-ex
ecutive-orders-on-immigration.aspx [https://perma.cc/H88B-AL3T] (discussing one of the
Executive Orders directed at sanctuary policies).
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This Note will argue that states, as the proper parent for their citizenry in this speci-
fic instance, should be allowed to sue on behalf of their residents to defend sanctuary
policies. Parens patriae, or quasi-sovereign standing, would allow states to get past the
Article III hurdle of standing—which is an initial requirement to bring a case or contro-
versy before federal courts.16 At issue here is a state’s ability to choose how to imple-
ment police power within its borders. Neither the federal government, nor individual
plaintiffs, are best suited to bring a lawsuit over such policies.17 This is a sensitive topic:
Immigration Law enmeshes every level of government and involves both citizens and
undocumented immigrants residing in communities across the country.18 Parens
patriae, or the doctrine of a state bringing a lawsuit on behalf of its citizens, is the
proper vehicle to justify states suing the federal government to defend sanctuary
immigration policies.
This Note is broken down into two primary sections. The first section will in-
troduce a variety of background material, with Part A addressing important points
in the history and development of parens patriae. Within Part A, subpart 1 will discuss
standing as a general Article III requirement, then subpart 2 will identify state standing
more specifically, and lastly subpart 3 will discuss parens patriae as a subset of state
standing doctrine. Then Part B will introduce the highlights in the controversy sur-
rounding parens patriae as a doctrine of standing by addressing three specific cases,
and how the doctrine has changed in the eyes of the Court over time.
The next section will involve a two-part analysis. First, in Part A of this section,
this Note will argue that parens patriae is the best vehicle for justifying state-based
lawsuits to defend sanctuary cities. Subpart 1 will involve a discussion of the con-
stitutional role that states play in our overall structure of federalism. Subpart 2 will
address concerns about federal Immigration Law preempting state law. Then Part B
of this section will address why parens patriae is an important basis for the particu-
lar issue of sanctuary cities. Subpart 1 of this final section will address the benefits
of allowing state attorneys general to sue on behalf of their citizens. Subpart 2 will
address other safeguards that provide prudential limits to ensure parens patriae
would not be an abused doctrine, flooding courts in the future.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History and Development of Parens Patriae as a Basis for State Standing
Parens patriae translates from Latin to mean “‘parent of the country’”19 and it is
a common law concept recognized by American courts.20 Parens patriae originated
16 See infra Section I.A.1.
17 See infra Section II.A.1.
18 See infra Section II.A.1.
19 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 n.8 (1982) (citing BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY which defines parens patriae as traditionally referring to the “role of [the] state
as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability”).
20 See id. at 600 (explaining that American courts now recognize the parens patriae
doctrine as a legislative prerogative).
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as the justification for a royal prerogative.21 This prerogative allowed the King of
England to personally sue as the sovereign on behalf of individuals, like minors,
who could not bring lawsuits themselves.22 Today, parens patriae is one type of
standing that states utilize to meet the standing prerequisite of the Article III case or
controversy requirement of the Constitution.23 Before delving too far into the nuances
of parens patriae standing, general standing requirements will be introduced as well
as state standing in order to place parens patriae into context.
1. General Standing
The “standing” requirement is enshrined in the “case or controversy” language of
Article III of the U.S. Constitution.24 A litigant must have standing in order to bring
a case before the Supreme Court.25 Standing doctrine is “‘built on a single basic
idea—the idea of separation of powers.’ In theory, standing limits Article III courts
to judicial business by requiring private litigants to show a concrete, imminent, and per-
sonal injury-in-fact traceable to the defendant and redressable by a judicial remedy.”26
Unlike private litigants, “[a] state has standing to vindicate its ‘sovereign power . . .
to create and enforce a legal code’ and to protect public health and welfare.”27
After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA,28 states are often said
to have a more relaxed or easier standard for standing than private litigants.29 This
is a result of the “special solicitude” given to states in that case, which is explicitly
denied to individual litigants, and allows states to show a less direct injury than
21 See Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern
Administrative State, 91 WASH. L. REV. 637, 662 (2016).
22 See Kenneth Juan Figueroa, Immigrants and the Civil Rights Regime: Parens Patriae
Standing, Foreign Governments and Protection from Private Discrimination, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 408, 431 n.119 (2002) (explaining the roots of parens patriae in English common
law which allowed the sovereign to use parens patriae status on behalf of children and
people with mental disabilities).
23 See Roesler, supra note 21, at 662 (“When this country achieved its independence, the
prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the states. And this power still
remains with them, except so far as they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal govern-
ment . . . . The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.”).
24 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1–2.
25 See Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions
Show That Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 2239, 2239 (1999) (introducing the insistence of the Supreme Court that litigants show
standing as well as injury, causation, and redressability).
26 Seth Davis, Standing Doctrine’s State Action Problem, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585,
595 (2015) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)).
27 Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601, 607 (1982)).
28 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see infra Section I.B.3.
29 See Davis, supra note 26, at 595.
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individuals bringing a lawsuit.30 Essentially, the “generalized grievance” standard which
the Court had previously rejected rather stringently may no longer be a prudential
limitation on standing for states going forward.31 A comparison of the injury, causation,
and redressability requirements required in Allen v. Wright,32 where the Court held
the parents of black public school children to a stringent level of analysis, compared
with the same elements as required by the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA,33 where
Massachusetts was able to submit a generalized grievance with attenuated causation
and redressability elements, demonstrates this differential treatment.34
2. State Standing
The case or controversy requirement of Article III is vague for many reasons,35
but in this context Article III’s vagueness about what cases state governments can
bring before the Supreme Court presents problems.36 State standing has changed
significantly throughout the Court’s history.37 Three particular sub-areas of prece-
dent that meet Article III muster are proprietary, sovereign, and quasi-sovereign
interests.38 Woolhandler and Collins explained that in the history of state standing:
[S]tates generally could pursue only their common-law interests.
These interests included those that individuals could pursue, such
as property or contract claims. By contrast, with the exception of
boundary disputes, states could not pursue their interests in “sover-
eignty.” Thus, states could not (in federal court) ordinarily liti-
gate against the federal government or other states[’] conflicting
30 Id.
31 Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign Preemption State Standing, 112 NW. L. REV. 201, 245
(2017).
32 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
33 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
34 Id.
35 Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine?: An
Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 594 (2010)
(“Indeed, even the most basic question of the origins of the standing doctrine eludes scholars.
Conventional accounts focus on the nature of the case or controversy requirement, the col-
lision between the administrative state and private rights–based models of judicial resolution,
and caseload management.”).
36 Tara Leigh Grove, When Can A State Sue The United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
851, 858 (2016) (“Article III provides that the federal ‘judicial Power shall extend to [certain]
Cases . . . [and] Controversies’ involving both the United States and the States. But the con-
stitutional text is noticeably silent about what types of ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ governments
may bring—that is, about the scope of governmental standing.”).
37 See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 392
(1995) (“Part I of this Article provides a revisionist history of state standing in the federal
courts.”).
38 Roesler, supra note 21, at 640.
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claims to regulate, nor could they seek to enforce their own legis-
lation or to vindicate their extrastatutory interests in protecting
their citizenry. Such sovereignty interests could be pursued only
through state legislation and its enforcement in the courts of the
legislating state. Such interests might also be indirectly considered,
incident to judicial resolution of familiar common-law disputes,
typically in cases not involving the state as a formal litigant.39
Proprietary interests are thus “analogous to private common law interests (state
property and contracts, for example),” and they “resemble injuries in suits between
private parties.”40 Sovereign interests can be best “understood as a state’s interests
in its jurisdiction—in terms of both (1) the geographic scope over which a govern-
ment exercises power and (2) whether it has authority to do so.”41 Quasi-sovereign
interests have been narrowed down to include two prongs.42 These are, “‘the health
and well-being—both physical and economic—of [a State’s] residents in general’ and
its ‘interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal
system’ by being excluded from benefits flowing from [the federal system].”43 Quasi-
sovereign suits have also been linked directly with parens patriae suits and both can
be traced back to public nuisance cases.44 These interstate nuisance cases overlapped
with state police power interests and were suits in equity that fell under the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.45 Notably, “[a] state’s sovereign integrity and
autonomy are most often related to the state’s police powers.”46
3. Parens Patriae Standing
Parens patriae standing and quasi-sovereign standing, as closely linked doc-
trines, can be collapsed into one category.47 Again, quasi-sovereign standing encom-
passes two common state interests: one is the health and well-being interest a state
has for its residents; and the other is the state’s interest in “not being discriminatorily
denied its rightful status within the federal system.”48 Many scholars assert that
39 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 37, at 392–93.
40 Roesler, supra note 21, at 640.
41 Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State Standing, 97 VA. L. REV. 2051,
2057 (2011).
42 See id. at 2064–67.
43 Id. at 2067.
44 Roesler, supra note 21, at 660.
45 Id. at 663.
46 David A. Nagdeman, Comment, Sovereign Ephemera: State Standing Against the Fed-
eral Government for Injuries to Quasi-Sovereign Interests, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 53, 61 (2017).
47 See Crocker, supra note 41, at 2071–72. Contra id. at 2062–63 (asserting that quasi-sov-
ereign interests should be separated out into a category independent of parens patriae standing).
48 Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?:
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when a state brings a lawsuit under the pretense of parens patriae, they are really
bringing a suit under the concept of quasi-sovereign standing because the two are
inextricably linked.49 The police power and health and well-being prongs are what
bind these two theories together.50 States have the police power to protect the health,
safety, and well-being of their citizens.51 Because the textual overlap immediately
anticipates the crossover between these two doctrines, going forward, when this
Note uses the term parens patriae, it will encompass quasi-sovereign standing as
well, so the two will be combined.
B. Controversy Surrounding Parens Patriae Standing
Throughout the Court’s history, parens patriae standing has undergone numer-
ous changes.52 This section will highlight three of the most important cases that led
to changes in the doctrinal development of parens patriae standing.
1. Massachusetts v. Mellon
There is plenty of controversy surrounding the Supreme Court’s treatment of the
concept of parens patriae standing. In particular, the 1923 case Massachusetts v.
Mellon53 led scholars to grapple with the validity of parens patriae as a basis for
state standing.54 In Mellon, Massachusetts sued on behalf of its resident taxpayers.55
Massachusetts alleged that the federal Maternity Act infringed on local concerns
within the state.56 Specifically, Massachusetts asserted that the Maternity Act
Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 WM & MARY L. REV. 1701,
1758–59 (2008) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)).
49 See Crocker, supra note 41, at 2071–72 (noting there is agreement that when states bring
quasi-sovereign suits they are also parens patriae suits). See also Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602–03
(“That a parens patriae action could rest upon the articulation of a ‘quasi-sovereign’ interest was
first recognized by this Court in Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900). In that case, Louisiana
unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a quarantine maintained by Texas officials, which had the effect
of limiting trade between Texas and the port of New Orleans. The Court labeled Louisiana’s in-
terest in the litigation as that of parens patriae . . . . Although Louisiana was unsuccessful in that
case in pursuing the commercial interests of its residents, a line of cases followed in which States
successfully sought to represent the interests of their citizens in enjoining public nuisances.”).
50 Roesler, supra note 21, at 663 (explaining that there is an overlap between parens patriae
and state police powers, specifically because the first lawsuits that states utilized parens patriae
for involved public nuisance issues).
51 Id.
52 See Roesler, supra note 21, at 662–77 (tracing the development of this doctrine through
many major cases beyond the three highlighted here).
53 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
54 See, e.g., Mank, supra note 48, at 1769–74 (discussing how the Mellon case seemed
to be a bar to states using parens patriae as a justifiable standing argument).
55 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 479.
56 Id.
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violated the Tenth Amendment by taking Massachusetts’s property, namely some
of the state’s future tax earnings, without due process.57 The Supreme Court held
that Massachusetts lacked proper jurisdiction to bring the case.58 In particular the
Court noted that:
Ordinarily, at least, the only way in which a State may afford
protection to its citizens in such cases is through the enforcement
of its own criminal statutes, where that is appropriate, or by
opening its courts to the injured persons for the maintenance of
civil suits or actions. But the citizens of Massachusetts are also
citizens of the United States. It cannot be conceded that a State,
as parens patriae, may institute judicial proceedings to protect
citizens of the United States from the operation of the statutes
thereof. While the State, under some circumstances, may sue in
that capacity for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its
duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations
with the Federal Government. In that field it is the United States,
and not the State, which represents them as parens patriae,
when such representation becomes appropriate; and to the for-
mer, and not to the latter, they must look for such protective
measures as flow from that status.59
After this case, states had to pass the “Mellon bar” and justify to the Court why they
were the proper parens patriae rather than the federal government in a particular
case.60 However, Mellon did not stop states from bringing parens patriae lawsuits.61
Notably, lower courts have concluded Mellon “was only a prudential limitation on
standing subject to congressional override rather than a constitutional prohibition
against standing.”62
2. Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico
After the addition of the “Mellon bar” to parens patriae standing analysis, the next
major case leading to a shift in the doctrine of parens patriae was Alfred L. Snapp
57 Id. at 479–80.
58 Id. at 480.
59 Id. at 485–86 (emphasis added).
60 Matthew R. Cody, Comment, Special Solicitude for States in the Standing Analysis:
A New Type of Federalism, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149, 157 (2009).
61 See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
62 Mank, supra note 48, at 1769–71. See David M. Howard, State Parens Patriae Standing
to Challenge the Federal Government: Overruling the Mellon Bar, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY
1089, 1108–1111 (2018) (arguing that the Mellon bar has been completely overruled by
history and precedent because it has been consistently disregarded in the courts, particularly
since Massachusetts v. EPA).
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& Son v. Puerto Rico (Snapp).63 In Snapp, Puerto Rico sued Virginian apple-growers.64
The growers were allegedly firing, refusing to hire, or were subjecting many quali-
fied Puerto Rican migrant growers to different conditions than other workers.65 The
Supreme Court held that Puerto Rico had a valid quasi-sovereign interest to bring
the suit.66 The Court noted that, “[i]n order to maintain [a parens patriae] action, the
State must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e.,
the State must be more than a nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign
interest.”67 Many scholars view Snapp as a turning point where the Supreme Court
established two important distinctions.68 First, the Court solidified the link between
parens patriae and quasi-sovereign standing.69 Second, the Court separated quasi-
sovereign/parens patriae suits into their own definitively unique category of
lawsuits70—separate and apart from proprietary or sovereignty based lawsuits, which
were the other two subcategories discussed above in Section I.A.2.71
3. Massachusetts v. EPA and the Modern Use of Parens Patriae
Since Snapp there has been some notable expansion of the parens patriae doctrine
as a justification for state standing. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly granted Massachusetts special solicitude regarding the three traditional threshold
requirements for standing (injury, causation, and redressability).72 The Court granted
this special solicitude because of the quasi-sovereign interest Massachusetts as-
serted.73 The Court characterized the quasi-sovereign interest as Massachusetts’s
interest in protecting its territory from environmental destruction.74 Massachusetts
sued the EPA for failing to comply with greenhouse gas emissions regulations.75 The
63 See 458 U.S. 592.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 607.
67 Id.
68 See Crocker, supra note 41, at 2093–94 (“Judge Hudson agreed with Virginia. Relying
on Alfred L. Snapp, he separated sovereign from quasi-sovereign interests, indicated that
parens patriae standing applies solely to the latter, and found that Virginia’s suit implicates
sovereign interests only.”).
69 Roesler, supra note 21, at 670–71.
70 See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 41, at 2066–67 (noting quasi-sovereign interests are
neither sovereign nor proprietary interests but its own category now that can serve as the
basis for a lawsuit when the well-being of a state’s populace is at stake).
71 See supra Section I.A.2 for an explanation of proprietary and sovereignty-based lawsuits.
72 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (“Well before the creation of the modern
administrative state, we recognized that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of
invoking federal jurisdiction.”).
73 Id. at 520.
74 Id. at 519–21.
75 Id. at 505.
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EPA was supposed to enforce a limit on emissions from cars, but had failed to
regulate them.76 The Court declared that Massachusetts had successfully met all of
the standing requirements to bring the case.77 The majority specifically held that,
“[g]iven . . . Massachusetts’s stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”78 In his
dissent, Chief Justice Roberts specifically addressed parens patriae, stating that,
“[f]ar from being a substitute for Article III injury, parens patriae actions raise an
additional hurdle for a state litigant.”79 Chief Justice Roberts did not stop there. He
also noted, “[j]ust as an association suing on behalf of its members must show not
only that it represents the members but that at least one satisfies Article III require-
ments, so too a State asserting quasi-sovereign interests as parens patriae must still
show that its citizens satisfy Article III.”80 Whether or not it merely creates an
additional hurdle for states to pass standing requirements or not, Massachusetts v.
EPA clearly shows that parens patriae standing is still a viable option for states to
bring lawsuits on behalf of their citizens.
Most recently, there was some use of parens patriae as a basis for state standing
in the “travel ban” cases.81 These cases challenge the Executive Orders of the Trump
Administration which restrict immigration from certain countries.82 In Aziz v. Trump,
the Eastern District of Virginia held that the Commonwealth had standing to bring
a case challenging the President’s Executive Order.83 Virginia was granted standing
because “to the extent that a state argues that executive action is inconsistent with
a federal statute, the state . . . is not [sic] be barred by the Mellon doctrine . . . when
the state has grounds to argue that the executive action is contrary to federal statu-
tory or constitutional law.”84
Additionally, in the D.C. Circuit, the Emoluments Clause litigation against
President Trump has also involved parens patriae standing.85 The court found D.C.
and Maryland had sufficiently alleged parens patriae standing in protecting “their
commercial residents and hospitality industry employees from economic harm.”86
This recent use of parens patriae demonstrates the continued relevance of this
doctrine today. In order to better understand the role that parens patriae standing
76 Id. at 513.
77 Id. at 526.
78 Id. at 520.
79 Id. at 538 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
80 Id.
81 See, e.g., Aziz v. Trump, 231 F. Supp. 3d 23, 31–32 (E.D. Va. 2017).
82 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8978–79 (Jan. 27, 2017).
83 Aziz, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 32.
84 Id. at 31–32 (citing Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 513
F.2d 1142, 1153 (9th Cir. 1975)).
85 District of Columbia v. Trump, No. 17-1596, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51365, at **13
(D. Md. Mar. 28, 2018).
86 Id. at **44–45.
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may play in cases of sanctuary policies, another timely issue before courts today, a
brief discussion of the development of those policies is necessary.
C. The Development of Sanctuary Policies
Immigration is one area where the role of state and local law enforcement has
been increasing and intertwining in recent years.87 States have had polarizing re-
sponses to this increased role: some states adopt “sanctuary” policies to limit “the
jurisdiction’s cooperation in federal enforcement efforts.”88 Other states have “sued
to compel federal officials to enforce” restrictive provisions like the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) to exclude and remove “unauthorized aliens.”89
The first sanctuary policy created is associated with a 1989 ordinance passed in
San Francisco.90 The ordinance was passed to prohibit the city’s money or resources
from being used to gather information on immigration status for the federal govern-
ment.91 Sanctuary policies are usually a response by communities within some states
to limit their level of cooperation with federal policies.92 Federal policies often call
upon local and state law enforcement to question the immigration status of arrestees.93
Federal policies may also deputize local law enforcement in an effort to get undocu-
mented immigrants into the custody of federal authorities.94 Some common forms
of sanctuary policies adopted in states involve local or state police choosing not to
enter into contracts with the federal government to hold detained immigrants in their
jails, refusing to allow Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) into jails without
a warrant, or restricting ICE from emotionally charged environments like hospitals
or schools.95 These policies can be formally adopted or they may be manifested as
87 See Monica Varsanyi, Paul Lewis, Doris Provine & Scott Decker, Immigration Federal-
ism: Which Policy Prevails?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.migration
policy.org/article/immigration-federalism-which-policy-prevails/ [https://perma.cc/C9YW
-CBR4] (discussing the transition away from strong federal control of immigration towards
a more intertwined approach with state and local law enforcement).
88 Manuel, supra note 2.
89 Id.
90 Ann Morse, Lydia Deatherage & Veronica Ibarra, What’s a Sanctuary Policy? FAQ
on Federal, State and Local Action on Immigration Enforcement, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (July 28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/sanctuary
-policy-faq635991795.aspx [https://perma.cc/EK88-PLBL].
91 Id.
92 See “Sanctuary” Policies: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1 (Feb. 2017), https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/sanctuary_policies_an
_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKV8-BDMJ].
93 See id. at 2.
94 See id. (noting that sanctuary policies have no set definition and often take different
forms).
95 See id.
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informal tactics used by local or state police.96 Regardless of the policy chosen,
“[t]he goal of the constellation of informal and formal policies is generally to protect
undocumented immigrants who are not otherwise engaged in criminal activity from
being detained or deported.”97
Notably, one of President Trump’s Executive Orders, on public safety within the
United States, directly attacked cities with sanctuary policies.98 The Executive Order
claimed that these jurisdictions must be reprimanded via restrictions on the funding
and grants they receive from the federal government.99 California has remained at
the forefront as a defender of its sanctuary policies.100 California recently brought
a lawsuit against the Department of Justice (DOJ) in response to “the administra-
tion’s plans to cut off millions of dollars in federal funding to so-called sanctuary
cities unless they begin cooperating with federal immigration agents.”101 California
is not alone in challenging the DOJ over funding cuts to sanctuary cities.102 Chicago
also brought a lawsuit alleging that funding cuts “‘fly in the face of longstanding
city policy that promotes cooperation between local law enforcement and immigrant
communities.’”103 Most recently, Attorney General Jeff Sessions has announced that
four cities must alter their practices on cooperating with federal immigration officials
to deport detainees held in local jails.104 Cities failing to comply will lose funding
for federal public safety grants.105 Thus, sanctuary policies, at the forefront of the
96 Tal Kopan, What Are Sanctuary Cities, And Can They Be Defunded?, CNN (Mar. 26,
2018, 3:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuary-cities-explained/index
.html [https://perma.cc/D2NA-AUVM].
97 Id.
98 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 15.
99 Id.
100 Vivian Yee, California Sues Justice Dept. Over Funding for Sanctuary Cities, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/california-sues-trump-adminis
tration-over-sanctuary-city-policy.html [https://perma.cc/VBM7-5XUN].
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., Kopan, supra note 96 (discussing pushback despite threats of the loss of fed-
eral funding in Chicago and New York and noting “more than 200 state and local jurisdictions
did not honor requests from Immigration and Customs Enforcement to detain individuals”).
103 Ilya Somin, Chicago Files Suit Against Justice Department Policy Targeting Sanctuary
Cities, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/08/07/chicago-files-suit-against-justice-department
-policy-targeting-sanctuary-cities/?utm_term=.2b3379deaeee [https://perma.cc/W36S-6B7V].
See also Franco Ordonez, Mexico Jumps Into Battle Over Texas ‘Sanctuary City’ Law, MIAMI
HERALD (Oct. 20, 2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/article179944046
.html [https://perma.cc/PAR5-GNEK] (demonstrating how far-reaching the impact of sanc-
tuary policies are since Mexico is challenging a new Texas law that “if implemented, would
crack down on sanctuary cities”).
104 Dartunorro Clark, Sessions Targets Four ‘Sanctuary Cities’ for Punishment, NBC NEWS
(Oct. 12, 2017, 1:43 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/sessions-targets
-four-sanctuary-cities-punishment-n810131 [https://perma.cc/3DC7-GLDB].
105 Id.
2018] WHO’S YOUR SOVEREIGN? 585
debate about the role of states in federal immigration enforcement,106 provide an
interesting and poignant case study for arguments about parens patriae standing
because of the links to quasi-sovereign state interests and particularly the focus on
the police powers of states.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Parens Patriae as a Vehicle for States to Defend Sanctuary Policies
Parens patriae standing, or the ability of a state to bring a lawsuit in order to
protect its quasi-sovereign interests,107 is the appropriate justification for standing
in lawsuits defending sanctuary policies. Multiple scholars have argued that states
should receive special standing when their enforcement or administrative role is at
issue.108 States, “[h]aving agreed to play an administrative role, . . . have a direct
interest in shaping the policies and actions of the federal agencies charged with
ultimate authority under an administrative scheme. Having surrendered lawmaking
authority, states have a clear interest—as separately constituted governments—in
the implementation of federal law.”109
Other scholars have taken on even more radical arguments about the potential uses
of parens patriae, including one assertion that foreign governments should be able
to use this standing doctrine to bring lawsuits on behalf of immigrants in the United
States.110 As state and local law enforcement are expected to continue to take on in-
creasingly heightened roles in the enforcement of federal immigration policy,111 it
should be expected that more litigation will arise where states and cities will seek
to challenge the demands placed on them. Parens patriae standing best justifies
these suits.
106 See Bryan Griffith & Jessica M. Vaughan, Maps: Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and States,
CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD., https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-States [https://
perma.cc/K5GB-HE8Q?type=image] (last updated May 30, 2018) (depicting maps of sanctuary
cities, counties, and states and areas at risk of losing funding from the federal government
because of such policies).
107 Crocker, supra note 41, at 2067 (noting that quasi-sovereign interests involve two prongs:
first the state interest in the health and well-being of their citizens and second an interest in pre-
venting the state from being discriminatorily denied its rightful status in the federal system).
108 See Grove, supra note 36, at 883 (arguing that states should only receive special
standing in limited circumstances, namely when they are suing to protect the enforceability
of their own regulatory laws); see also Roesler, supra note 21, at 678 (advocating for a “gov-
ernance approach” to allow states to challenge federal authority when the states are given a
role in the implementation of federal law).
109 Roesler, supra note 21, at 677.
110 See Figueroa, supra note 22, at 410; see also Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, Associational
Standing for Cities, 47 CONN. L. REV. 59, 65, 99 (2014) (arguing that cities should be given
associational standing like that available to corporations as an alternative to the messy parens
patriae doctrine which does not lend itself to an easy definition).
111 See supra Section I.C.
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1. Linking Sanctuary Policies and State Police Powers: The Role of the States in
Our Constitutional Framework
Sanctuary policies are crafted to achieve many different goals including: “strength-
ening resident-police relations and ensuring that all people feel comfortable report-
ing crimes, regardless of immigration status; allowing the police to determine how
they will prioritize and allocate their resources; and protecting police agencies from
liabilities resulting from local enforcement of federal immigration laws.”112 The
wide variety of goals prompting sanctuary policies all tie directly to a state’s police
powers and duty to protect the health and well-being of its citizens. Although federal
immigration laws generally preempt state immigration laws,113 sanctuary policies
raise a different issue that is not preempted. This is because sanctuary policies are
a reaction to the role demanded by the federal government from state and local law
enforcement in the administration of federal immigration law. States are not creating
sanctuary policies in order to have conflicting state immigration laws, they are re-
acting to federal laws which commandeer state police as administrative arms for
federal policy,114 and states should be able to challenge this overreach into their
realm of authority.
Additionally, with the “lack of coordination between the various policymaking
bodies, immigration enforcement has the potential for cross-jurisdictional conflict
and overlap, resulting in uncertainty among immigrants about which policy pre-
vails.”115 Beyond the confusion that this power-sharing creates among different
levels of government, “[t]he devolution of immigration enforcement from federal
to local authorities threatens to disrupt fragile trust, nurtured over the years, between
local law enforcement and immigrant communities.”116 The intertwining of all levels
of government here should leave critics less concerned about states seeking to
challenge their role within this system,117 especially when states are trying to vindi-
cate the interests of their citizens.
Arguably, states are also vindicating their constitutional role and satisfying a func-
tional purpose by bringing parens patriae suits, because one “major role for the states
under the constitutional design is to ensure the continued health and well-being of
112 “Sanctuary” Policies: An Overview, supra note 92.
113 See Cody, supra note 60, at 168–69 (discussing the need for Congressional authorization
for states to challenge federal immigration laws because state laws are necessarily preempted
and cannot conflict with federal laws).
114 See Varsanyi et al., supra note 87 (“Many large cities, for example, oppose enforcement
partnerships with the federal government, but they operate within a jurisdictional network
that subordinates their policymaking powers to the state. Sheriffs, who exercise considerable
power over their entire county, add additional complexity.”).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See Roesler, supra note 21, at 677.
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their citizens. The surest route the Constitution uses to protect the state’s ability to
pursue this role is to preserve . . . [the] prerogative to exercise its police power.”118
Recent cases challenging the President’s travel ban orders have asserted the sover-
eign interests states have in “‘carrying out its refugee policies’. . . [but note] legisla-
tive acts regulating foreign persons, straddle both the state’s governing interests and
territorial concerns.”119 Thus, states are vindicating their constitutional role in bringing
these suits, not unduly expanding their power.120
Scholar Jonathan Remy Nash uses this constitutional/functional role argument
to support his claim that states should have “sovereign preemption state standing”
to bring claims when the federal government preempts state law but then under-
enforces the federal law that Congress enacted in that area.121 Although Nash is
trying to open a limited window of access to the federal courts, by limiting standing
to situations of underenforcement that have a nexus between the preempted and the
underenforced areas of the law,122 his argument that underenforcement alone is
appropriate is unconvincing in the context of sanctuary cities. Nash asserts that police
power is purely an affirmative power to regulate, “not the power to abstain from
regulation.”123 But this ignores the realities of police as they interact with immigrant
communities as discussed above.124 One exception where the federal government
should not be able to over-enforce, or to try and coerce local and state police, is this
especially sensitive area of immigration enforcement activity by police. Perhaps this
could open up a potential slippery slope: if the door is opened for states to sue over
this sensitive area, where do we close that door? But it seems that the nature of this
particular issue, where implications for legal versus undocumented immigrants, as
well as the intertwined nature of local, state, and federal law enforcement in main-
taining law and order, calls for an exception.
Nash’s point that standing should be limited to under-enforcement because there
is less of a concern about finding private plaintiffs to assert the same issue is also
particularly untrue in the sanctuary city context.125 The fear that immigrants face in
this context, whether they hold valid legal status in the country or not, will silence
118 Nash, supra note 31, at 231.
119 Nagdeman, supra note 46, at 94 (citing Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 765–66 (9th
Cir. 2017)).
120 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Symposium, Federalism All the Way Up: State Standing and
“The New Process Federalism”, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1739, 1750 (2017) (citing Lujan v. Defs.
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992)) (asserting that “vindicating the public interest is a func-
tion usefully assigned not only to ‘the Congress and the Chief Executive,’ but to the states
as well”).
121 Nash, supra note 31, at 206.
122 Id. at 241–44.
123 Id. at 243.
124 See Varsanyi et al., supra note 87 (noting the difficult and delicate nature of trust be-
tween local police and immigrant communities).
125 Nash, supra note 31, at 244.
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many would-be plaintiffs.126 Thus, this particular context calls for the ability of the
state to sue on behalf of its citizens, which will be discussed further below, and this
is true despite the fact that this is not a case of under-enforcement within Nash’s
proposed theory.127
2. The Potential Preemption Issue
It is worth noting that “[p]reemption alone is not sufficient to grant standing to
a state against the federal government.”128 But since state police powers and quasi-
sovereign interests are the focus at the heart of sanctuary policies, parens patriae
standing is the logical means to justify these lawsuits. If states and cities were bringing
these claims solely to vindicate issues about being preempted by federal law, they
would certainly be invalid.129 Here, there is a “true quasi-sovereign interest” as
called for by scholar Jonathan Remy Nash.130 Nash argued that these “true quasi-
sovereign interests differ from competing parens patriae interests in that a state
asserting the former argues that the federal government has wrongly divested it of
specific police power authority, leaving it unable to act within its borders to protect
its citizenry.”131 Nash identified “competing parens patriae interests” as claims
where states try to argue that their parens patriae claim should eclipse any compet-
ing claim by the federal government, and Nash established that the Court has
“routinely rejected standing based on” this premise.132 With sanctuary city chal-
lenges, states are not asserting that their parens patriae status supercedes the federal
government’s; instead, they are arguing that the executive branch is violating the
separation of powers by appropriating Congress’s legislative power,133 or alterna-
tively because the executive is infringing on state police powers.134
It must also be noted that it is widely accepted that the “regulation of immigration
is a core police power that the states have largely ceded to the federal government.”135
However, one can distinguish between the ability of the federal government to legislate
and create immigration policy as separate from the implementation role which states
126 See Varsanyi et al., supra note 87 (“Nevertheless, for those who lack legal status or
have status issues, the situation remains perilous, as residents complain of racial profiling and
pretextual arrests.”).
127 Nash, supra note 31, at 243–44.
128 Nagdeman, supra note 46, at 67.
129 See id.
130 Nash, supra note 31, at 218.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 217–18.
133 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 120, at 1741 (first citing San Francisco v. Trump, No. 3:17
-cv-00485 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2017), then citing Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2017)).
134 See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
135 Nash, supra note 31, at 247.
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and local police are tasked with, which is in fact essential to the federal government en-
forcing its policies at all.136 Although “immigration, as a form of control over one’s
sovereign borders . . . [was] an aspect of sovereignty that states surrendered to the
federal government upon ratification of the Constitution,”137 states still have a distinct
and important role in implementation that should justify defending the policies that
their police want to utilize.138 Who is best positioned to know their local communities
and how best to enforce immigration laws without creating chaos? Federal law enforce-
ment certainly lacks the connection required to handle this implementation,139 but states
should not be forced to blindly apply tactics that will disrupt their communities.
Additionally, Missouri v. Holland140 can be read to support the idea that states
have not ceded all control over the land within their borders, and to support the
argument that enforcement of immigration policies should be up to state and local
police.141 Missouri challenged the Migratory Bird Treaty, which the United States had
signed with England, and Missouri challenged the congressional act passed to enforce
compliance with the treaty.142 The Court seemingly rested its determination to grant
Missouri standing in this case on the conclusion that “the State’s quasi-sovereign
rights in the natural resource of migratory birds within its borders” was a valid interest,
meeting the injury, causation, and redressability requirements of Article III standing.143
It is also “fairly clear that the State complained of losing the power to regulate
territory within its borders as to which it had never ceded sovereignty.”144 The same
reasoning could be applied to this context for sanctuary cities. States may not be
able to preempt federal immigration policy,145 namely congressional decisions about
what the federal policy will be,146 but they have not ceded the ability to police the
land within their borders how they see fit. If states fail to follow federal law at all,
of course issues would arise since federal immigration law preempts state law, but
states should have the full power to choose how to reasonably implement those
policies on their turf.
This is especially true because this area of the law is “essential to the territorial
and jurisdictional integrity of the state, and, by virtue of the constitutional structure
136 See, e.g., Varsanyi et al., supra note 87 (explaining the federal government’s increasing
reliance on local and state police to enforce immigration policy).
137 Nagdeman, supra note 46, at 78.
138 Id. at 78–79.
139 See Varsanyi et al., supra note 87 (“The devolution of immigration enforcement from
federal to local authorities threatens to disrupt fragile trust, nurtured over the years, between
local law enforcement and immigrant communities.”).
140 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
141 See Varsanyi et al., supra note 87.
142 Holland, 252 U.S. at 431–32.
143 Nash, supra note 31, at 219–20.
144 Id. at 220–21.
145 See supra Section II.A.2.
146 See supra Section II.A.2.
590 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:573
of dual sovereignties, the state has no other forum in which to pursue an adequate
remedy.”147 Although the “expansion of federal authorities operating in fields tra-
ditionally under the states’ sovereign police powers creates regulatory conflicts with no
easy constitutional answers . . . the burden and responsibility of making these determi-
nations is shifting . . . into the federal court system.”148 This shift should justify the
Court accepting cases involving sanctuary policies in the future, as a particularly novel
area where state adjudication is necessary to vindicate and protect their citizenry.
Finally, scholar Shannon Roesler honed in on one aspect of the Snapp case
discussed above which is particularly relevant to why parens patriae is the appropriate
doctrine for lawsuits regarding sanctuary policies. Roesler stated that the “Supreme
Court decided Puerto Rico in 1982 after roughly two decades of unprecedented
congressional expansion of federal administrative authority over health, safety and
environmental issues—the very issues traditionally within the state’s police power.”149
Roesler further traced the transition of the regulatory landscape by noting: “States
now governed alongside and in cooperation with federal administrative agencies.
They could not competently exercise their police powers—their authority as parens
patriae—without participating in the modern administrative state. This regulatory
reality permeates the Puerto Rico decision.”150 Roesler is tracing the rise of the role
of states within an expanding federal regime over time. Roesler then advocates for
her governance approach as a simpler means to justify standing.151 But there are
benefits to keeping parens patriae as an addition to the common standing elements
of injury, causation, and redressability. This is especially true because those three re-
quirements seem to be more leniently applied to states in the post–Massachusetts v.
EPA world,152 in a way that may have been controversial for the Supreme Court
historically but is now arguably an adopted practice.153
147 Nagdeman, supra note 46, at 79.
148 Id. at 80.
149 Roesler, supra note 21, at 672.
150 Id. at 672–73.
151 See id. at 678.
152 See Davis, supra note 26, at 587 (“Standing doctrine has a state action problem. There
are different standing rules for state actors than for private litigants. Standing doctrine
requires private litigants to show a concrete, imminent, and personal injury-in-fact traceable
to the defendant and redressable by a judicial remedy. Yet the doctrine does not require the
same showing from government litigants. A government litigant may litigate ‘generalized
grievances’ and need not show a personal injury-in-fact to have standing.”).
153 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 547–48 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“Today’s decision recalls the previous high-water mark of diluted standing requirements,
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669 (1973) . . . . In SCRAP, the Court based an environmental group’s standing to challenge
a railroad freight rate surcharge on the group’s allegation that increases in railroad rates would
cause an increase in the use of nonrecyclable goods, resulting in the increased need for nat-
ural resources to produce such goods. . . . Over time, SCRAP became emblematic not of the
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Roesler’s governance approach must be contrasted with Tara Leigh Grove’s
argument that states should not be given special standing when their only interest
is in forcing the executive to implement federal law.154 Grove separates the interest
that states have in protecting state law from the separate interest states may have in
the manner in which federal agencies implement federal law.155 Unlike Roesler’s
approach, which would allow states to sue whenever their administrative role is impli-
cated,156 Grove’s approach goes even further and would limit states’ ability to sue
in their administrative role only if they are suing to “protect state law from interference
by federal agencies.”157 Even under Grove’s more limited approach, states suing to
protect their existing sanctuary policies meets this tougher standard—because the
states are suing to protect state law from federal interference. This falls under Grove’s
exception that “[w]hen the federal executive ‘nullifies a’ state experiment . . . a State
should have the authority to bring suit to protect the continued enforceability of its
law.”158 One can also argue that sanctuary policies are important “experiments” by
the states which should not be swept in or out by the federal executive’s administra-
tion but instead should be up to the relevant state to delineate.
B. Importance of Parens Patriae as a Requirement for State Standing
In Massachusetts v. EPA, Chief Justice Roberts asserted in his dissent that
parens patriae merely creates an additional hurdle for states to pass in order to show
they have met standing requirements.159 But this “hurdle” may actually balance out
any of the concerns that states are receiving unwarranted special treatment in
meeting standing requirements.160 Requiring states to show that they have a substan-
tial interest in their citizenry would provide an additional safeguard to prevent states
looseness of Article III standing requirements, but of how utterly manipulable they are if not
taken seriously as a matter of judicial self-restraint.”).
154 Grove, supra note 36, at 890.
155 See id. at 868.
156 See Roesler, supra note 21, at 678.
157 Grove, supra note 36, at 891.
158 Id.
159 See supra Section I.B.3; cf. Sara Zdeb, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massachu-
setts v. EPA: Parens Patriae Standing for Global-Warming Plaintiffs, 96 GA. L.J. 1059, 1075
(arguing that parens patriae should be a separate route from the traditional three-prong test
for private litigants for states to meet standing requirements: “the premise that parens patriae
suits are civil analogues to state criminal prosecutions—in both cases, states seek to vindicate
public rights—supports the argument that they inherently meet Article III’s case-or-controversy
requirement and are not subject to the three-prong standing test”).
160 See Ann Woolhandler, Symposium: Standing in the Robert’s Court: Governmental
Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 209, 225, 228–30 (2014) (criticizing
parens patriae standing because individuals can bring suits on their own, and arguing that indi-
viduals have more of an interest in invalidating laws than states do).
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from abusing this doctrine. It would also prevent states from taking advantage of the
more lenient standards that Massachusetts v. EPA solidified.
But parens patriae may not need to be viewed as an additional hurdle at all.
Scholar Matthew Cody has argued that when it comes to state standing, states should
be able to use quasi-sovereign, or parens patriae, standing when they have been
given congressional authorization to sue.161 Specifically, Cody mentioned immigra-
tion as a context where state police powers are easily triggered, making this a
prominent area where congressionally authorized state standing could be useful.162
If standing was congressionally authorized, then this would not be a “hurdle” for
states to meet at all, however there may be implications arising from requiring con-
gressional authorization, which will be discussed later along with other proposed
safeguards to limit the doctrine of parens patriae.163
Aside from Cody’s arguments, scholar Bradford Mank argued that, “Because
the parens patriae doctrine gives states the right to protect a broad range of interests
that affect the health, safety, welfare, and economics of their citizens, it is reasonable
to give states broader latitude in obtaining standing for generalized injuries that
affect many of their citizens.”164 This is in opposition to the stance Chief Justice
Roberts took in his dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA because Mank is asserting that
the generalized grievance standard simply makes the process of meeting standing
requirements easier for states,165 thus no hurdle at all exists. Regardless of whether
parens patriae is viewed as an additional hurdle, or a mechanism that eases the
requirements for states to satisfy standing, parens patriae should be required for
other reasons beyond mere justiciability issues.
1. Benefits of a Role for State Attorneys General
There are also distinct benefits to having states sue rather than individuals.
Bradford Mank noted some of the benefits of state attorneys general suing in place
of individuals, including that a “state in a parens patriae suit may be able to secure
broader relief and represent a broader range of interests than a suit by individuals,
even if those individuals file a class action.”166 Mank also noted that it is “generally
less costly for the state [attorney general (AG)] to file one lawsuit than for dozens
of private individuals to file suit.”167 State attorneys general can also choose a more
tactical, strategic approach in their litigation by allying with “colleagues in other
161 Cody, supra note 60, at 168–69.
162 Id. at 168–69.
163 See infra Section II.B.2.
164 Mank, supra note 48, at 1767 (noting that “[c]ourts have recognized parens patriae
standing for mass torts and consumer fraud”).
165 See id.
166 Id. at 1781.
167 Id.
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states to reduce costs or to increase the level of legal or technical expertise for the
plaintiffs, as in the Massachusetts litigation, where twelve state AGs joined as
petitioners.”168 Allowing states to sue in the place of individuals also reduces the
pool of litigants, which can help the efficiency of the courts.169 Political obligations
will likely limit the number of lawsuits any state attorney general will take the time
and effort to bring.170 State attorneys general will still need to appeal to a wide
enough constituency to maintain support, and perhaps it could be beneficial to have
important national issues play a role at the state level if state attorneys general
become motivated to take on issues of policy that can cross state boundaries or lead
to multistate litigation.171
There has been some scholarship suggesting that state attorneys general would
be overly ambitious in what cases they chose to engage in against the federal govern-
ment,172 but the limitations they face in terms of resources like time and money reduce
this concern.173 State attorneys general “are usually confronted with significant demands
on their limited resources, which can quickly become overtaxed when confronted with
the demands of complex multistate litigation such as the Massachusetts case.”174
However, there are also arguments that state attorneys general have too politi-
cally charged a role, making them inadequate litigants on behalf of their citizens.175
Grove noted that, “state attorneys general are elected by the voters of the State and
often politically ambitious. (Indeed, one political scientist has suggested that ‘AG’
is often short for ‘aspiring governor.’) Accordingly, state attorneys general have
strong political incentives to respond to the preferences of state constituents.”176
Although the potential danger of needing to appeal to a majority of the electorate
could arise, the monetary and time limitations mentioned above should limit this
concern too. Lastly, there is also a concern that with a reduced standing requirement,
168 Id. at 1782.
169 Cody, supra note 60, at 171.
170 Id.
171 Mank, supra note 48, at 1784.
172 See, e.g., Nagdeman, supra note 46, at 85 (arguing that state actors present accountability
problems and have a “perverse accountability incentive . . . to pursue ideological agendas
that play well to a localized base but could have outsized national impacts”).
173 See Lawrence G. Wasden & Brian Kane, Massachusetts v. EPA: A Strategic and Jurisdic-
tional Recipe for State Attorneys General in the Context of Emission Accelerated Global Warm-
ing Solutions, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 703, 723 (2008) (“But this does not mean that attorneys general
will view [Massachusetts v. EPA] as a mandate to engage the federal government in litigation.”).
174 Id.
175 See Grove, supra note 36, at 896 (“These state officials have a legal obligation to
protect the interests of their respective States (by, for example, litigating on behalf of state
agencies, or defending state law); they have no special responsibility to focus on the national
public interest.”).
176 Id. at 896–97 (also noting that “[p]erhaps unsurprisingly, the existing research suggests
that state attorneys general often bring lawsuits that are likely to curry favor with state voters”).
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post–Massachusetts v. EPA,177 the costs will be lower for state attorneys general to
bring these types of lawsuits.178 This may increase the number of national policy
issues playing a role in state campaigns if state attorneys general start to focus on
broader issues that may have more appeal to their constituents.179 But state attorneys
general are supposed to have a “substantial portion” of the population affected in
order to bring a parens patriae claim,180 so perhaps the real concern should be that
minority interests face yet another obstacle in being heard.
Despite the reasonable arguments on both sides for the motives of state attor-
neys general, there are other protections in place that have been largely forgotten in
this debate, but which will prevent state attorneys general from reaching too far and
upsetting the balance of federalism in their use of parens patriae standing.
2. Safeguards to Limit the Use of Parens Patriae
Other doctrines create safeguards that the courts can use to limit state attorneys
general in bringing parens patriae suits. One example are Rule 11 sanctions under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to stop any frivolous claims from coming
forward.181 Under Rule 11(c), courts may impose sanctions on attorneys or parties
that file frivolous claims.182 This should deter state attorneys general from bringing
lawsuits without merit, and when this is coupled with the political considerations
that were discussed above, it should incentivize meaningful lawsuits with particular
relevance to the state’s citizenry.
Another example of a safeguard against a flood of parens patriae litigation is
the political question doctrine. The Supreme Court has used this doctrine to reject
cases that would pull the Court into a political battle or into an area it believes is
reserved for a different branch of government.183 This doctrine leaves whole sectors
177 See Davis, supra note 26, at 587.
178 Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2007).
179 Id.
180 See Roesler, supra note 21, at 667 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,
236 (1907)).
181 Mank, supra note 48, at 1783.
182 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
183 See Matthew S. Melamed, A Theoretical Justification for Special Solicitude: States and
the Administrative State, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 577, 592 (2010) (“While the
standing and political question doctrines are independent considerations, examining the three
standing requirements through the lens of the political question doctrine sheds light on justifica-
tions for those requirements.”). See also Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Vir-
tues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1863 (2001) (providing a
broader discussion of the political question doctrine: “Although influential scholars criticize
the political question doctrine, its bar on jurisdiction supports the idea that Article III courts,
lacking a democratic portfolio, ought to intervene in public life only ‘in the last resort,’ even
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“of public life to Congress and the President, on the grounds that the Constitution
assigns responsibility for these areas to the other branches, or that their resolution
will involve discretionary, polycentric decisions that lack discrete criteria for
adjudication and thus are better handled by the more democratic branches.”184 The
political question doctrine specifically “can be seen as a coordinate doctrine that
helps courts weed out a number of, but not all, political questions.”185 The combina-
tion of standing and political question doctrines will certainly have the effect of
limiting what cases will be brought before the Supreme Court.
One final example of a potential limitation is for the courts to require congres-
sional authorization for a state to be able to sue to vindicate or challenge its role in
the enforcement of federal legislation.186 This could present problems in today’s
politically polarized world and states may be robbed of an important role in our
dual-federalism framework if they must await congressional approval before chal-
lenging the federal government.187 There is also little credence to the concern that
sanctuary policy-based litigation “would expand the power of the judiciary at the
expense of both the executive and legislative branches.”188 Not only do the safe-
guards discussed here severely limit this possibility, but in light of the multiple ways
that states could frame their challenge of the Executive branch—i.e., as a vindication
of their police powers189—the concern is not that the Court will overstep, but rather
if the Court refuses to intervene, many communities will suffer, and states will be
left without any forum for their claims.190 It is unlikely that “the ideological gridlock
of the national legislature [will] infect the federal courts,”191 as David Nagdeman
warned, again because states have limited resources and time to bring these claims.
Additionally, our constitutional system was designed for inefficiency and gridlock,192
apologetically, when the other, presumably more democratically legitimate, branches default
on their obligations.”).
184 Hershkoff, supra note 183, at 1862.
185 Melamed, supra note 183, at 592.
186 See Leah M. Litman, Taking Care of Federal Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1289, 1334–35
(2015) (arguing that state interests in enforcing federal law do not fall into quasi-sovereign
interests and should require Congressional authorization).
187 This statement is especially true lately. See Jordain Carney, Senate Dems Block Crack-
down on Sanctuary Cities, THE HILL (Feb. 15, 2018, 3:26 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor
-action/senate/374078-senate-dems-block-crackdown-on-sanctuary-cities [https://perma.cc
/B9H2-H4NV] (discussing the recent battle over these policies between the executive and
legislative branches, demonstrating gridlock is no less of a barrier at the federal level).
188 Nagdeman, supra note 46, at 86.
189 See supra Section II.A.
190 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
191 Nagdeman, supra note 46, at 88.
192 See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 120, at 1740–41 (discussing the foundations of
federalism and the necessary “jousting” between states and the federal government over how
federal law is carried out).
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so this should not be a motivating factor in casting out an opportunity for states to
vindicate important claims, especially when they have no other avenue to challenge
them.193 But the options discussed in this section really attest to the fact that there
are other safeguards, or potential safeguards, to prevent states from overusing the
doctrine of parens patriae.194 Ideally, this doctrine would not be one which state
attorneys general used without the proper gravitas and concern for their citizens,
however these other doctrines provide definitive ways which courts could still limit
the parens patriae cases that were deemed justiciable.
There have also been some more extreme arguments about how far parens
patriae standing could extend. One such argument was briefly mentioned above and
comes from Kenneth Juan Figueroa, who asserts that parens patriae could be used
to justify foreign governments suing on behalf of immigrants in United States
courts.195 Another argument, working toward justifying suits from the opposite end
of the spectrum, comes from Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, who asserts that cities
should be able to sue on behalf of their citizens in a parens patriae–like role.196 Note
that Caruso’s article seeks to get around parens patriae by utilizing “associational
standing” from the realm of corporate law.197 However, both of these arguments seem
to come from more radical possibilities for parens patriae that are not rooted in
precedent, unlike the discussion here regarding sanctuary policies. The three safe-
guards discussed above are likely to prevent more traditional parens patriae cases
so concerns over the more extreme possibilities introduced here should not deter the
use of parens patriae going forward.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, parens patriae is the most logical basis for states to have standing to
sue on behalf of their residents to vindicate sanctuary city policies. States have a unique
and historic interest, linked to the justifications for quasi-sovereign interests which
were used as a basis for standing scattered throughout the Court’s history,198 that
justify this basis for standing. The interest in protecting and implementing state and
local police powers in a way that reasonably works from community-to-community
193 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
194 See also Raymond H. Brescia, On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers
of State Standing, 96 OR. L. REV. 363, 439–40 (2018) (arguing that “regardless of the adminis-
tration or political party in power, states can serve as political and constitutional counterweights
when they perceive that the federal government is threatening their interests and those of
their constituents”).
195 Figueroa, supra note 22, at 470.
196 Caruso, supra note 110, at 61. See also Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV.
1227 (2018) (arguing that plaintiff city claims add value as a form of state building).
197 Caruso, supra note 110, at 83.
198 See supra Sections I.A.2–3.
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is best left to the determination of the states.199 This is especially true in light of the
transition of immigration enforcement power in recent years from the federal gov-
ernment to local and state police.200 Additionally, the sensitive nature of immigration
enforcement, particularly the delicate balance a community must strike to avoid
inciting chaos and fear while trying to enforce the law, calls for states to be able to
challenge the federal government when it overreaches or over-enforces its power
and infringes on the police power of the states.201
Parens patriae could also be a beneficial requirement for state standing for
sanctuary city challenges because it may provide a backstop to calm the nerves of
those who question the more lenient standard which states receive when proving
they have met the injury, causation, and redressability requirements for standing
post–Massachusetts v. EPA.202 If parens patriae can be used to attain justiciability
for cases on sanctuary policies, it will allow the Supreme Court to help clarify this
very muddled area of federalism, where the acceptable immigration policies vary so
widely by jurisdiction and by state despite the mismatch of the federal government
handing down broad Executive Orders with policies meant to restrict every locale
equally.203 Parens patriae is not an “ill-fitting, expansive grant of standing,”204 espe-
cially as it can be limited by the many safeguards, like the political question doc-
trine, discussed above.205 The parens patriae doctrine should be reaffirmed in the
post–Massachusetts v. EPA world, where states enjoy special solicitude. Reaffirm-
ing this doctrine would allow states to vindicate the important immigration interests
of their residents and citizens by making decisions about how best to implement
local and state police power. Especially in the context of immigration, these imple-
mentation decisions should be left not to the federal government, but to the states
and locales directly responsible to their residents who are immediately impacted by
these policies. To allow states and localities to defend such decisions, they must be
able to get past the hurdle of standing to bring their cases in federal court, and again
as parens patriae, or parents of their citizens in this particular context, states should
be given standing to represent and defend their sanctuary policies.
199 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
200 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text (responding to Nash’s arguments about
under-enforcement of the Executive branch justifying state lawsuits and arguing immigration pro-
vides a context where over-enforcement is just as important a justification for state lawsuits).
202 See supra Section II.B.
203 See supra Section I.C.
204 Nagdeman, supra note 46, at 92.
205 See supra Section II.B.2.
